

CHARTERING CHANGE?:

The potential and pitfalls of reintroducing public service broadcasting to TVNZ

Margie Comrie

Department of Communication & Journalism; Massey University, New Zealand

Susan Fountaine

Department of Communication & Journalism; Massey University, New Zealand

Abstract

In early 2003, the implementation of a controversial charter created the most significant change, since the advent of private television, for New Zealand's state-owned television organisation, TVNZ. Unlike the ABC, TVNZ dominates national ratings, is funded largely by advertising and has to compete with private companies for programme funding. The Charter aims to reinstate public broadcasting values in what has become a commercial entity.

In the late 1980s, New Zealand led the world in broadcasting deregulation, opening up the airwaves to local and overseas competition, and enforcing profit motives on state owned television (Cocker, 1992). TVNZ has been enormously successful in a commercial sense, returning substantial dividends to the government throughout the 1990s. However, this has been accompanied by a rising tide of criticism about "quality" particularly in the top-rating One News and various current affairs programmes. This is part of an international backlash against the "tyranny of ratings" and recognition of the media's role in what Carl Bernstein (1992) dubbed "the growth of the idiot culture". Fears of the death of civil society (Putnam, 2000) have also rehabilitated the ideals of public broadcasting.

In 1999 the new Labour government came to power promising a return to public service television through a charter supported by a less commercial "crown-owned company" structure. Development was slow and dogged by political and broadcasting industry criticism. Meanwhile TVNZ profits dipped and top jobs changed hands.

Under TVNZ's Charter the emphasis will be on "social obligations" and content that reflects "the true reality and diversity of New Zealand life" (Hobbs, 2001), with quality news and current affairs a priority. However, concern has been expressed over the vague nature of the Charter, and the potential loss of revenue that would accompany any loss of audience share. A decrease in profit would also hinder TVNZ's chances of adopting new technologies, in a market driven by commercial pressures and technological change.

This paper begins by backgrounding these controversies, and goes on to outline the expectations various stakeholders have for the Charter. It draws on original interviews with key political and industry players, media coverage and political debates. In light of TVNZ's recent history and that of other public broadcasters, such as the ABC, the paper will also explore the potential and pitfalls of the Charter. TVNZ

has arguably gone further down the path of commercialisation than any other public broadcaster, and the Charter, “at best a set of laudable aims, at worst a nebulous clutch of homilies” (Espiner, 2001), cannot alone bring about a return to public broadcasting values. We conclude that this requires not only money, but also a cultural change combined with the kind of public promotion that heralded the market-driven changes that shaped the current TVNZ.

Introduction

In New Zealand, state owned broadcasting has been restructured so many times that a former Broadcasting Corporation chairman and chief executive Ian Cross referred to broadcasting as a battered baby (Gregory, 1985). Perhaps because of this, public service broadcasting in New Zealand has rarely attracted much public support, passion or debate. Britons have had “Aunty BBC” to love or hate since the 1930s and, while Michael Tracey (1997) laments the decline and fall of British public broadcasting, it remains comparatively robust. Similarly, in Australia, the ABC’s funding may be subject to government pressure and its content scrutinised, but it remains large and generally viable.

However, public broadcasting all but disappeared in New Zealand in the 1990s when local radio stations were sold and National Radio only rescued by a combination of “grey power” pressure on a conservative government and a private member’s bill introducing a Charter. Meanwhile, the two state-owned television channels, retaining the bulk of the audience, became virtually indistinguishable from privately owned competitors. “Putting back the clock” or “restoring the public into television” - depending on your viewpoint – presents, therefore, a major political challenge against a number of competing vested interests.

Politics, funding and the public service model

Since its beginning, broadcasting has regulated with Western-style democracies placing far more controls on broadcasting than on the Press. This is largely because television in particular has been regarded as a uniquely powerful medium and until recently the spectrum allowed for few channels. Technological advances, combined with the growing power of business and of media barons, swept away much broadcasting regulation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Deregulation proponents argued that competition would ensure greater choice and a free “marketplace of ideas” (Veljanovski, 1989). However, growing concern that commercial broadcasting cannot deliver the quality and quantity of information needed for an informed citizenship (Kellner, 1990), prompted moves in Europe (that met with limited success) to revive public service systems (Hibbard, 2001; Ward, 2003). Meanwhile, the recognition that society is more diverse and that technology provides us many more information channels requires that public broadcasting be re-invented to be relevant for the 21st century.

Public service broadcasting (PSB) has defied definition partly because funding and ownership structures vary in different legal, constitutional and social contexts. However, official reports such as Alan Peacock’s 1986 white paper *On the Financing of Broadcasting* and academics such as Tracey (1997) and Scannell (1990) frequently refer to the British Broadcasting Research Unit’s eight principles developed in the 1980s. These cover universality of availability, universality of appeal, provision for minorities, concern for national identity and community, commitment to education,

detachment from vested interests, competition for good programming rather than for numbers and guidelines to liberate programme makers (Higgins, 1999). Such ideals have underpinned the development of public broadcasting and are reflected in the charters that direct many public broadcasters.

Like other Commonwealth countries, New Zealand's version of public service broadcasting (PSB) is identified with the BBC and its first leader, John Reith (Gregory, 1985). However, New Zealand, along with Australia and Canada, adopted PSB selectively (Cocker, 1996) and the early years of public radio were marked by government's "meddling and self-interested role" (p.83). Broadcasting was run from one government department and its journalists employed by another department, until the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation (NZBC) was formed in 1962. Gregory says that although the NZBC was designed to distance the broadcasting minister from programming activities, political interference, conflicts and restructuring followed, with the split between radio and television occurring in 1975. For television, the next decade was marked by political and financial pressure, linked in particular to the freeze on licence fees resulting in growing reliance on advertising revenue, decreasing local programming and rising viewer complaints. All this provided fertile ground for the wholesale restructuring and deregulation of the fourth Labour government.

In 1988 public service broadcasting was dismantled as part of the ideologically-driven privatisation of the state. Television New Zealand (TVNZ) - retaining both channels and the transmission facilities - was made a State Owned Enterprise (SOE) whose prime responsibility was to make a profit. The SOE proved itself commercially astute, positioning its two channels to retain the majority of market share and becoming indistinguishable from wholly commercial television stations (Comrie, 1999). In fact New Zealand, with no restrictions on who can buy radio stations and television channels, is arguably the most deregulated broadcasting environment in the western world (Cocker, 1992). The prospect of selling the more populist TV2 channel remained on the political agenda throughout the 1990s, although the National government lacked the will to do this while TVNZ returned substantial dividends. The total of taxes and dividends paid to the government increased yearly from \$7 million in 1990 to almost \$90 million in 1996 (Suich, 1997).

Battle to establish the Charter

A change of government following the 1999 General Election saw the Labour-led coalition begin to implement its new broadcasting policy. The state broadcaster was commercially very successful; with the highest audience share of any broadcaster in the English speaking developed world (Laugesen & Maling, 2002) but concern had been mounting about falling standards, the amount of advertising, and the abandonment of public service principles. Labour promised to decrease the dividend TVNZ was required to return to the government, in return for the broadcaster reducing the amount of advertising and investing in more local content and minority programming. Broadcasting Minister Marian Hobbs claimed New Zealand could not afford fully subsidised public television, but that a charter would increase the quality of New Zealand television.

The Charter was announced in May 2001 and was to be phased in from 1 July 2002. A parliamentary bill was needed to change the commercial model at TVNZ and convert the SOE into a crown company. The bill also signaled the separation of the

broadcasting (i.e. Channels One and Two) and transmission arms (Transmission Holdings Ltd, THL) of the SOE, into two different entities. After extensive lobbying by both TVNZ (who opposed the split) and the Sky Network (who supported it), it was decided that TVNZ would become a crown company and THL would remain a SOE, able to pursue commercial opportunities. The required TVNZ Bill was tabled on December 11, 2001, and referred to Select Committee for discussion. However, the timetable for implementing the Charter was disrupted by the announcement of an early election, held in July 2002.

The opposition National and ACT parties vocally opposed the bill, claiming the new model would allow the government to use the broadcaster for spreading propaganda, and would be too costly. There was also criticism about the vagueness of the Charter wording. According to Drinnan (2002), “most of the charter obligations are impossible to quantify and some are mere platitudes” (p.1). This reflected limited knowledge, as the proposed charter was similar to overseas models and considerably more detailed, for instance, than the ABC charter enshrined in the Australian Broadcasting Act.

The Labour government’s promise to reintroduce public service principles heralded several years of turmoil at TVNZ. In January 2000 Helen Clark announced the government was pulling the plug on the TVNZ’s plans to launch digital channels and its own digital platform. In mid February board chairperson, National Party appointed Roseanne Meo, was forced to resign early. This was part of the backlash when TVNZ faced an embarrassing \$6 million settlement bill after luring presenter John Hawkesby from TV3 and then firing him a few weeks later when One Network News ratings plunged. By March 2000, Meo’s replacement, Ross Armstrong, was investigating a review of news and promising salary cuts for celebrities. Laugesen and Maling (2002) reported that eight executives had left the state broadcaster between April 2001 and February 2002, concerned about the loss of commercial ambition and the abandonment of digital plans. There were reports that TVNZ staff were uneasy about the changes, because of cost, the risk of political interference in editorial decisions, and the threat of political correctness (Espiner, 2002). A political reporter leaving TVNZ for its privately-owned rival, TV3, said his concerns about indirect political interference under the Charter contributed to his decision (McCarroll, 2002).

The dust seemed to be settling in 2002 when Ian Fraser, replaced the last of the National appointees, Rick Ellis, as chief executive. However, Chairman Ross Armstrong was forced to resign in October 2002, after concerns about inappropriate spending. Appointed to drive the Charter, Armstrong’s tenure had been marked by spats with news staff over standards and public glee over the departure of head of news and current affairs Paul Cutler (Beston, 2002). Finally, in January 2003, the new Head of News and Current Affairs, Heaton Dyer, resigned after a brief tenure, saying he lacked the energy to continue.

A battle with the TVNZ board that Hobbs lost in June 2002, about including the Charter in its statement of corporate intent, marked the end of her difficult tenure as Broadcasting Minister. As a first time Cabinet Minister, Hobbs had a steep learning curve in a difficult portfolio, which suffered from a lack of expert policy advice (Ralston, 2001). Hobbs (personal communication, March 14, 2003) says she had to make a very early decision about TVNZ’s digital plans under intense lobbying

pressure. The Hawkesby debacle, her “fluffs” in Parliament and resulting image as “Auntie Marian” did not help. Further, the Ministry of Culture and Heritage, which devised and consulted on the charter, was seriously under-resourced. She was attacked from both Right and Left and destructive rumours abounded among the tight Wellington pressure groups. TVNZ was solidly opposed, “They thought they could cosset me and bring me round tho their way of thinking and when I didn’t they decided to campaign”. The fight was “dirty” she recalls and the staff were “scathing”. She remembers staff turning their backs on her when she visited TVNZ. Although Ross Armstrong’s tenure as board chairman and departure were controversial, Hobbs says he understood the Charter and did “a very good job of driving it through”. Other changes to the board helped the process and the turning point came with Fraser’s appointment as chief executive.

Implementing the Charter

Following the re-election of a Labour-led coalition in July 2002, long-serving MP and Minister, Steve Maharey, replaced Hobbs. Several months later, in January 2003, the Government and TVNZ finalised an agreement to pay \$12million to TVNZ to enable it to commission programming in keeping with the Charter principles of airing diverse content (State tags \$12m for TV shows, 2003). The TVNZ Bill finally passed through Parliament on February 27, 2003 and the Charter was officially implemented on March 1.

The Charter consists of nine objectives and fourteen actions. The first objective is the classic triad of public service, “informing, entertaining and educating”. The remaining objectives reiterate four themes consistently evoked in the discussions about public service television: the role of building community and citizenship capacity, the call for quality and integrity, the role of nurturing the creative industries and pushing creative boundaries, the provision for a wide range of interests with a special emphasis on neglected minority interests. Because of New Zealand’s commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi, Māori participation and “the presence of a significant Maori voice” receives special mention.

The requirement to fulfil these objectives begins with providing “independent, comprehensive, impartial and in-depth coverage and analysis of news and current affairs”. The Charter then prescribes programming that contributes towards “intellectual, scientific and cultural development, promotes informed and many-sided debate”. The Charter specifies that all New Zealanders should have access to programmes promoting Māori language and culture. TVNZ should feature programmes that: serve Māori interests and needs, reflect the regions, promote understanding of New Zealand’s diverse cultures, promote local material, cater for the needs and participation of children and young people, support the arts, reflect sporting and leisure interests, and support learning and personal development. TVNZ must also maintain and observe an ethics code on advertising to young people.

On the eve of the Charter’s introduction Broadcasting Minister Steve Maharey noted that his predecessor had born the brunt of the initial negative response:

I think what Marian [Hobbs] faced was just an extraordinarily hostile environment which ran all the way to people who were actively working to stop this happening through to a sense of well why are we doing this, why are

we bothering to do any charter. So I think the process just was a slow steady one while the political climate changed (personal communication, February 1, 2003).

In retrospect he considered the time taken to implement the Charter may have allowed a new and more sympathetic culture to slowly develop at the state broadcaster:

people who don't want to be part of that may well have made the choice to move on to other occupations and new people have come on board so I think there's a genuine sense of anticipation now in TVNZ about what they might do with the Charter but that wouldn't have been there two or three years ago.

That is a view shared by Public Affairs Manager Glen Sowry. Although media reports mention continuing staff disquiet he said, in a February 21, 2003 interview, that the Charter had now been largely "sold" to staff:

It would be fair to say that two or three years ago, when the Charter was first talked about, there was a degree of uncertainty and concern amongst some staff...In the intervening two or three years I believe that as more has been explained about what the Charter does, and that it does in fact provide, particularly our creative people, opportunity to really enhance their craft, if you like, I think most people are embracing it...people are very positive about it and believe that it is a good thing for the company.

Sowry denied that it had been a "battle" to win staff support, saying staff were receptive to the concept, and TVNZ chief executive Ian Fraser, in particular, had communicated the company's new vision "very clearly and very openly".

In implementing the Charter much depends on Fraser. His predecessor was business-focused Rick Ellis hired to "boost the value of the company and prepare it for sale" (Ralston, 2001). Fraser, described by political commentator Jane Clifton (2002) as a "genial, intelligent, household-beloved, high credibility TV interviewer" (p.23), and who most recently headed the national symphony orchestra at a time of growing productivity and popularity, appears an inspired choice as the public face of the reinvented TVNZ. Whatever the battles inside the company, Fraser is out selling the Charter and countering fears. He told members of influential pressure group SPADA (representing independent producers) that the Charter is a response to the growing evidence that New Zealanders are dissatisfied with the standard of television. While Charter delivery had to be non-commercial in practice "I believe we can add richness and diversity – get the appreciation index a way up – and still turn a buck" (Fraser, 2002, p. 11). He assured his audience that TVNZ would not become politically compliant, as in-house protocols and the Charter's wording protect television content from government meddling.

Making it work: The challenges

So what is needed then to put the aspirations of the Charter into practice? First, people must both understand and support public service broadcasting. As Broadcasting Minister Steve Maharey acknowledges,

You don't get in this country a sort of stout defence of broadcasting, its independence, a culture of public broadcasting or institutional arrangements. I can't imagine in a country like France, for example, people tolerating a lot of what's been done in the last little while around public broadcasting and that just tells you that New Zealanders don't really share an understanding of public broadcasting which they take to be all that important.

Maharey talks frequently about building a culture of understanding. All public broadcasters are facing the challenge of legitimising themselves now that so many communication channels exist serving diverse audiences, and TVNZ's challenge is greater because of its commercial orientation as a profit-making SOE:

It was marching to the dictate of the dividend then and now hopefully it's going to begin responding to its Charter and people will think differently. They'll do different things and out of that you hope will come new programmes and new choices which will be recognisably different and will be in the minds of people: public service broadcasting...that's what I think public service broadcasting is; it's an institution.

Nonetheless, the Charter-driven institution has to broadcast the right mix of programmes and be effectively financed. TVNZ has been concerned to retain the confidence of advertisers. Public affairs manager Glen Sowry pointed out that advertisers "generate some \$290 million in advertising revenue which funds this organisation". The money received from government is relatively small in comparison. TVNZ has therefore devoted a lot of time to "educating" advertisers about the Charter, and allaying their concerns about a significant drop in audience for TV1 and TV2. Maintaining a balance between Charter delivery and audience retention remains a key challenge for TVNZ.

No doubt because of this, TVNZ stresses the importance of meeting the public service commitment through popular programmes. CEO Ian Fraser, though frequently described as "cultured" and elitist", positions himself as a rugby supporter who also has popular tastes. He says ratings are important not only because of income but because of the mission to show New Zealanders more about themselves. Fraser says programmes must *combine* information with entertainment, "Some would say you have to do them separately. I'd see that as a charter to bore" (Clifton, 2002, p.23). A third essential for Fraser is "broadening the public taste". He would like "programmes on minority-interest issues that might conceivably be of interest to a general audience" (Clifton, 2002, p.23). Sowry backs this up, citing programming such as *Sahara* and the series, *Give It a Whirl*, currently being produced, which is "100 percent Charter. Most people would just look at that as great telly. The thought that it was Charter would never even cross their minds."

But not all Charter requirements can be met with high-rating programmes. The Government has given \$12 million to meet Charter objectives. There is, though, no guarantee about future funding and there is already some pressure on TVNZ to show how the money is being spent, pressure Fraser is resisting on the grounds that politicians should not engage in programming decisions (Cleave, 2003). Currently, government funding can come from two other sources. TVNZ can apply in competition with private channels for New Zealand on Air funding attached to

specific programmes to meet target needs. As well, the government could reduce the amount it takes as a dividend from TVNZ, or forgo the dividend altogether. TVNZ wants the dividend reduced and, while Maharey acknowledges it might need extra money, he says that because TVNZ earns the bulk of its income from advertisers, the government has to continue asking for a dividend. Effectively, he believes TVNZ and the government will have to “work their way” to a funding formula and “just see how it goes”. The high-rating status of TVNZ’s current programming and its heavy reliance on advertising, means it cannot just simply apply funding models from public broadcasters overseas.

Media commentator Brian Edwards suggested that the existing low level of Charter funding would mean little change to prime time programming (personal communication, February 14, 2003). He referred to a comment from former Head of Television at TVNZ, Shaun Brown, that obligations to broadcast non-revenue earning material under the Charter would mean TVNZ had to earn more revenue at other times. Instead of creating (as Fraser hopes) popular programmes from what might have been expected to be minority interest topics, Edwards predicts continued marginalisation. So, he says, arts programmes, programmes “seen to be worthy of public interest” and Māori programmes will continue to be run out of prime time “and out of prime time means marginalising”.

Conclusion

Despite the evident commitment of the Prime Minister, it has taken the Government three and a half years to institute the Charter and clearly the real battle has just begun. TVNZ has enormous potential to become a top class public broadcaster with a huge public following for three reasons. First, TVNZ’s two channels already have two thirds of a national audience that remained consistently loyal in the face of private competition. Second, the broadcaster continues to pull in more advertising dollars than any other single medium, despite a worldwide downturn in free to air television advertising earnings. Sowry says their advertising revenue has “never been stronger” and that advertisers demonstrated their confidence by making lot of bookings “post Charter”. Finally, New Zealand audiences are enamoured of news, current affairs and much of their current local programming.

However, TVNZ’s very success makes the pitfalls of trying to implement the Charter more profound. Government funding is inadequate to produce programming required to fulfil the Charter and the government, and probably taxpayers, see less reason to give money to a commercially successful organisation. The former head of Britain’s commercial ITV network comments: “it’s invidious to give [TVNZ] onerous public responsibilities without payback. Otherwise it’s wishful thinking to say that a Charter will make any difference” (Peacock, 2003). So far there is no guarantee that what funding there is will not dry up with a change of government. All this will increase rather than decrease the pressure on TVNZ to retain its high-rating prime time programmes. Further, audiences generally identify public service values with boring programming that will inevitably be unpopular. This is partly related to TVNZ’s response when it moved to the commercial model and echoed overseas rhetoric (e.g. Brittan, 1989) by categorising the old model as “grey”, elitist and out of touch with viewers (Mounter, 1991). It will require remarkable programming and promotional ability to re-educate the public about the benefits of public service values.

TVNZ recognises it faces an enormous challenge in delivering the expectations bound up in the Charter. A variety of pressure groups will all want the broadcaster to deliver on programming for their particular interest, politicians will closely scrutinise the news for “fairness” and in depth coverage, the creative industries will expect more employment and older viewers will expect “better” television. Sowry says managing expectations is particularly difficult because change will be incremental and has already been gradual for two years, so there will be little immediate visible change.

The broadcaster has to report to the government regarding Charter delivery and Sowry, along with others, has been investigating monitoring tools and has plans to introduce an appreciation index, focus groups and on-line E-panels to accompany quantitative measures. The Minister of Broadcasting also clearly views the progress to full Charter implementation as a slow one with TVNZ exploring the programming possibilities and working to achieve the optimum funding formula. However, recent pressure for TVNZ to be transparent about its Charter spending shows Maharey’s credibility will be on the line along with the public broadcaster unless TVNZ can satisfy critics.

TVNZ therefore almost inevitably faces future criticism from a variety of disappointed parties. In the light of this, the Charter’s aspiration to place TVNZ somehow at the centre of New Zealand public life may seem ironic. However, this very aspiration brings hope to media critics who have long been forced to accept TVNZ’s first priority must be profit. State owned television in New Zealand has finally adopted a charter; something other public broadcasters have long taken for granted. The Charter is now part of law and if the government grasps the nettle of establishing a secure future funding regime, TVNZ, with its massive loyal audiences, is in a strong position to creatively reinvent public broadcasting for local audiences. Public broadcasters around the world are being forced to accept a shrinking place in a shrinking public sphere (Higgins, 1999). Whatever the outcome of TVNZ’s Charter experiment it is encouraging to see one broadcaster, albeit belatedly, recommitting itself to viewers as citizens.

References

- Beston, A. (2002, October 21). Chief’s strong arm tactics. *New Zealand Herald*, <http://tiki.knowledge.basket.co.nz/daily>. Accessed March 10, 2003.
- Bernstein, C. (1992, June 14). Journalism and the growth of the idiot culture. *Guardian Weekly*, p. 21.
- Brittan, S. (1989). The case for the consumer market. In C. Veljanovski (Ed.), *Freedom in broadcasting* (pp. 25-50). London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Cleave, L. (2003, March 1). TVNZ told to show where charter money is going. *New Zealand Herald*, p.A7.
- Clifton, J. (2002, March 9). A current affair. *Listener*, pp.22-24.
- Cocker, A. (1992). Deregulation and commercial radio. In M. Comrie & J. McGregor (Eds.), *Whose News?* (pp.52-59). Palmerston North: Dunmore.
- Cocker, A. (1996). “A toaster with pictures”: *The deregulation of broadcasting in New Zealand*. Unpublished doctoral thesis. University of Auckland, Auckland.
- Comrie, M. (1999). Television news and broadcasting deregulation in New Zealand. *Journal of Communication*, 49(2), 42-54.
- Drinnan, J. (2002, July). Charter snag. *OnFilm*, p.1.
- Espinier, C. (2002, 29 June). Hobbs backs away from TVNZ revamp until after

- election. *Press*, p.6.
- Fraser, I. (2002). *At home with the Charter*. Notes from a speech given to SPADA, November 15, 2002. Source TVNZ.
- Gregory, R.J. (1985). *Politics and broadcasting: Before and Beyond the NZBC*. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.
- Hibberd, M. (2001). The reform of public service broadcasting in Italy. *Media, Culture and Society*, 23, 232-252.
- Higgins, M.D. (1999). Active citizens or passive consumers? Culture democracy and public service broadcasting in the era of an unaccountable market. In Arthur Grime & Jo Tyndall (Eds.), *Counting the beat: Culture democracy and broadcasting*. IPS Policy Paper No. 4. Wellington: Victoria University.
- Hobbs, M. (2001, May 1). *Public TV charter released* Media release from the office of the Minister of Broadcasting.
- Kellner, D. (1990). *Television and the crisis of democracy*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview.
- Laugesen, R., & Maling, N. (2002, February 24). Broadcast blues. *Sunday Star Times*, p.1.
- McCarroll, J. (2002, December 8). Another egg swaps baskets as TV3 goes poaching again. *Sunday Star Times*, p.7.
- Mounter, J. (1991, March). *Strategic management in a deregulated environment*. Paper presented to the South Pacific Regional convention of the Institute of internal Auditors
- Peacock, C. (2003, March 15). The popularity contradiction: How does the broadcasting world view the New Zealand Charter experiment, *Listener*, p. 24.
- Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Ralston, B. (2001, August). Prime time. *Metro*, pp.62-68.
- Scannell, P. (1990). Public service broadcasting: The history of concept. In A. Goodwin & G. Whannel (Eds.), *Understanding television* (pp.11-29). London: Routledge.
- State tags \$12m for TV shows. (2003, January 17). *Evening Standard*, page unknown.
- Suich, M. (1997). *Benchmarking public broadcasters: How TVNZ compares with other state owned broadcasters in Australia, Britain and Canada*. TVNZ: Auckland.
- Tracey, M. (1997). *The decline and fall of public service broadcasting*. New York: Clarendon Press.
- Veljanovski, C. (1989). The role of advertising in broadcasting policy. In C. Veljanovski (Ed.), *Freedom in broadcasting* (pp. 129-164). London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Ward, D. (2003). State aid or band aid? An evaluation of the European Commission's approach to public service broadcasting. *Media, Culture & Society*, 25(3), 233-251.

Address for correspondence

Dr Margie Comrie
Dept Communication & Journalism
Massey University
Private Bag 11 222

Palmerston North
New Zealand
M.A.Comrie@massey.ac.nz