Extreme Make-Over “Balkan Style”: Media Coverage of Radovan Karadzic's Arrest

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Abstract
The arrest of a former Bosnian Serb political and military leader Radovan Karadzic in July 2008 has triggered a wide-spread international interest and offered one of the crucial moments for the Serbian public and its media to reflect upon the role of Serbia in the 1990s former Yugoslav wars. Karadzic was a president of the self-proclaimed Serbian republic in Bosnia, and was indicted for genocide and crimes against humanity in 1995. On the basis of a critical discourse analysis, we argue that Television Serbia, while covering Karadzic’s arrest, re-constructed an implicit nationalistic discourse. Television’s portrayal offered a dominant interpretation of the former Yugoslav wars, representing Serbia as a superior and innocent nation, cleared of any responsibility for the wars, while it safely marches into the EU.

Keywords
media, television, Serbia, war crimes, critical discourse analysis
Introduction

On July 21 2008, Serbian media scene was shocked by event still hunting the Serbian community: the arrest of Radovan Karadzic. He was captured as Dragan Dabic in Belgrade, where he was cultivating a long white beard, practicing alternative medicine, was a regular health magazine contributor and even gave public lectures. According to the Serbian radical party, he is “the greatest Serbian hero”, but former UN ambassador Richard Holbrooke calls him “a European Osama bin Laden”.

On July 22, 2008, a day after his arrest, the television program entitled “Television Serbia on Radovan Karadzic” showed on Television Serbia (TS) achieved the highest ratings of any program in Serbia (Gledanost RTS, 2008). Serbian electronic media have been for decades one of the crucial producers and reproducers of dominant nationalistic ideology (Milivojevic, 1996; 2007). As many authors point out (Milivojevic, 2007; Milosevic, 2008), the nationalistic framework still characterizes most prime-time television programs in Serbia.

In this paper, we present a study which uncovers how the TS exploits and further incorporates a particular social event (in our case, Karadzic’s arrest) into “implicit” nationalistic discourses. This analysis is based on the work performed in critical discourse analysis that deals with principles of recontextualization and representation of social actors. We argue that TS constructed implicit nationalistic discourse while ignoring the themes or social actors that would connect Serbia with Karadzic and represent the country in any negative light. At the same time, TS continued with the bipolar representation of social actors in which the Serbs remain superior above all the rest nations in the region.

The political-historical context

In 1990 Radovan Karadzic, a psychiatrist in a Sarajevo city hospital, helped to set up the nationalistic Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). Less than two years later, he declared the creation of the independent Serbian Republic of BH (later renamed Republika Srpska) with its capital in Pale, a suburb of Sarajevo. He also pronounced himself the head of the state. Karadzic’s political party, openly supported by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, mobilized and organized the Bosnian Serbs to fight against the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Croats in BH. The war in BH escalated in April 1992, when Bosnian Serbs besieged Sarajevo for 43 months, shelling Bosniak forces but also terrorising the civilian population with a relentless

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1 We define nationalistic discourse here as all those discursive practices and articulations that on the first level of an identity creation advocate a superiority of belonging to a nation.
bombardments and sniper fire (MacDonald, 2002). Bosnian Serb forces – assisted by paramilitaries from Serbia proper committed war crimes, including ethnic cleansing, establishment of concentration camps, destruction of property, and numerous massacres of the civilian population (97,207 civilian deaths) (Population losses in Bosnia and Herzegovina 92-95, 2007).

On October 15 1995, Karadzic publicly stated in front of the RS parliament that he does not regret the “radical mission”, and defined the massacre as the “defence against the Turks” (Repe, 2008, p. 45). Karadzic was also well-known for publicly celebrating the crimes against the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, claiming these were committed in the name of “srbstvo”, the so-called “Serbian identity”. War crimes were also committed against Serb civilians by Bosnian Serbs’ foes in the bitter inter-ethnic war (MacDonald, 2002).

On December 14 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement brought an end to the Bosnian war and divided BH into two entities: the Federation of BH inhabited mostly by the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, and the Republic Srpska populated almost exclusively by the Bosnian Serbs. Ironically, as many point out, this Agreement legalized Karadzic’s politics and his Serbian enclave, Republic Srpska (Verdery & Burawoy, 1999). Karadzic was obliged to step down as president of the SDS in 1996 as the Western politicians threatened sanctions against Republic Srbska, and later went into hiding. Karadzic faces eleven charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Karadzic is charged with responsibility for the Serbian slaughter of almost 8,000 Muslims at Srebrenica in July 1995, the long siege of Sarajevo, and the “ethnic cleansing” of north-western Bosnia in the autumn of 1992, when tens of thousands of non-Serbs were killed and hundreds of thousands driven from their homes.

During the arrest of Karadzic, the political situation in Serbia was tense and deeply divided. For example, on July 29 2008 the demonstrations against the Karadzic’s arrest were organized by all nationalistic oppositional political parties, including the Serb radical Party. The crowd of roughly 15,000 members screamed and chanted Karadzic’s name, while singing “Karadzic is a hero of the heroes.” At the same time, at different public occasions, death threats against the Serbian president Borislav Tadic were waged. Also, the “pro-Western” oriented government strongly rejected any form of independence for Kosovo, which proclaimed its sovereignty in February 2008.

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2 Serbian nationalists define the Muslims in former Yugoslavia as »the Turks« (Erjavec & Volcic, 2007). In this example, Bosniaks are called the Turks.
Theoretical framework

The mainstream research on media discourses in recent years has been focused on a broad framework of a critical discourse analysis, which is concerned with diverse issues such as the ideological underpinning of discourse. Hall defines critical discourse analysis as “the mental frameworks – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation – which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, figure out and render intelligible the way society works” (Hall, 1996, p. 26). These mental frameworks serve as orientation in the society we live in and seem to be essential for cognitive survival in everyday life. Therefore, in order to identify ideologies in any articulation it is necessary to look at how reality is represented in it and what kind of attitudes, values, beliefs, biases and/or perspectives are encoded in the text.

In particular then, the concept of ideology is one of the most controversial and elusive academic issues. According to Van Dijk (1998), ideologies are considered as some kind of “system of ideas” and hence they occupy a particular place in the symbolic field of thought and belief, that is, in a “cognition”. Beside that, ideologies are clearly social and mostly associated with group interests, conflicts or struggle. They may serve to legitimize or to resist power or dominance, or they may represent social problems and contradictions. They may be related to social classes and other social groups as well as institutions, organizations and other forms of social structure. Finally, the concept of ideology can be associated with language use, as can be seen in the claim that ideologies are typically expressed and reproduced in and through language. The primary functions of ideologies in a society, such as concealment, manipulation and so forth, are mostly discursive social practice (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 5).

Mass circulation and sharing among group ideologies all presuppose communication, that is, expressions or reproductions in the media. Social reproduction requires both the reproduction of material conditions of social life and the reproduction of symbolic forms such as values, beliefs, attitudes, etc., which are, to some extent, socially shared and which serve, to some extent, to shape the actions and attitudes of individual members of society.

The media, and especially television, were among the crucial tools of the war effort in all former Yugoslav republics, and controlled by the nationalistic and populist forces, inciting ethnic hatred and denigrating the democratic opposition. In Serbia, during the 1990s, there was a dominant professional ideology of a so-called “nationalistic journalism.” There are a lot of elements characteristic of this journalistic discourse (De la Broose, 2003; Milivojevic, 1996, 2007; Milosevic, 2008): “us-versus-them” dichotomy, “my-nation-right-or-wrong”
version of reporting, substantiation of the myths of superiority of the Serbian nation in relation to the other nations of the former Yugoslavia, and forging the sense of national pride and patriotism.

Real changes in media policy, ending the dominance of State television, came after the fall of Milosevic’s regime in October 2000, but they still remain incomplete. TS was liberated from Milosevic’s governmental control and that resulted in an immediate change of editorial policy. However, the new government recognized the importance of state television and slowed down the changes. As many scholars note (e.g. Milivojevic, 2007), despite the fact that TS attempted to transform itself into public service institution, TS does works as a state television, since it is not independent from governmental structures and it still predominately reproduces dominant political discourse.

Method: Principles of recontextualization and representation of social actors
Fairclough (2003) and Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) definition of a recontextualization as a representation of social events. While recontextualization often involves the suppression and filtering of some meaning potentials of a discourse (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999), it is also a process which may expand meaning potential, through additions to, and elaborations upon, the previous text. Particular social fields, particular networks of social practices have associated with them specific recontextualizing principles. These are specific “principles” according to which they incorporate and re-contextualize social events. These principles underlie differences between the ways in which a particular type of social event is represented in different fields, networks of social practices, and genres. Fairclough (2003, pp. 139-140) develops the following principles: Presence (e.g. which elements of events, or events in a chain of events, are present/absent, prominent/background?), Arrangement (e.g. How are events ordered?), Abstraction (e.g. what degree of abstraction/generalization from concrete events?), Additions (e.g. what is added in representing particular events – explanation/legitimizations (reasons, purposes), evaluation?). Recontextualization is a specific kind of a dialectic that appropriates and colonizes discourses from different spaces and times (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). In this respect, our study attempts to uncover how Serbian national television appropriated Karadzic’s arrest into an implicit nationalistic discourse.

In order to identify TS’s recontextualization, we also analyse how TS represented the main social actors, i.e. who is included within “us” realm and who is positioned as “them”. As Hodge and Kress (1993) argue, one of the central discursive strategies in ideological struggles relies on the construction of in-and-out group identities using discursive means. For these...
reasons we adopt Hall's “discourse of difference” (1989, p. 913) as the most effective method to think through binary positions. Hall understands this discourse as that which makes a distinction between “us” and “them”. Any kind of identity, as Hall further suggests, is primarily defined as a difference from the other. As Morley and Robins (1995) argue, nationalistic discourses of exclusion and inclusion are embedded in media as well, although usually masked.

Data

We analysed all 78 news items broadcasted on all TS news programmes from 21st of July (the day of Karadzic’s arrest) up until 30th of July, 2008 (the day when Karadzic was sent to the Hague). It was during this period that political situation in Serbia was very intense and conflictual, since the majority of opposition opposed the president, government, and institutions responsible for the arrest. We've analysed news program TS precisely because it is still the most watched news programs in Serbia, known for its pro-governmental orientation. In that, the analysis of its program can explain the official governmental politics (Milivojevic, 2007). TS broadcasted two special news programs (on Tuesday, the 22nd of July 2008 between 20.15 and 24.00; and Wednesday, the 23rd of July 2008 between 20.15 and 22.00) focusing on the arrest of Radovan Karadzic, called “Radovan Karadzic- Myth and Reality”, both having extremely high ratings of 60 % (roughly 2.5 million viewers) in Serbia. Also the rest of news programmes enjoyed high ratings (Gledanost RTS, 2008).

First, we follow a macro-structure analysis of recontextualization’s principles to find out how TS represented Karadzic’s arrest. Later, we employ a micro- analysis of the representation of the main social actors.

TV Serbia’s recontextualization of Karadzic’s arrest

(A) Presence and absence of elements of chains of events

Which chains of events were present, or absent, in television news dealing with Karadzic arrest? Our analysis has indicated that TS broadcasted the following recurring themes of the Karadzic’s arrest:

A. A life of Radovan Karadzic as Dragan Dabic;
B. Karadzic’s arrest as one of the crucial obligations and defining principles for Serbia in its path towards EU;
C. The details of Karadzic’s arrest, the legal procedures of the arrest, and his extradition to the Tribunal;
D. Karadzic’s family;
E. The legal procedures in the Hague Tribunal and the descriptions of Karadzic’s future life in the prison;
F. Different reactions of politicians to Karadzic’s arrest;
G. Biography of the Karadzic;
H. Protests against the Karadzic arrest;
I. Death threats against the Serbian president, ministers, and journalists.

The analysis has showed that the most prominent theme has been a hidden life of Karadzic, pretending as Dragan Dabic. TS has focused on his new looks, his way of behaviour, clothing, speech, psychological state of mind, his alternative medicine interests, new love life, his shopping habits, his visiting of a “Crazy house” café, his writing for alternative medicine journal “Healthy life” etc.

The next most reported theme - also in quantitative terms - was devoted to the Serbian foreign policy towards European Union (the EU) and International Community. TS has represented Karadzic’s arrest as a point of departure for Serbia in its cooperation with EU and the International community, for which Serbia should be rewarded with some concrete investments from EU itself.

TS coverage further focused on the details of the arrest, the legal procedures and political consequences of the arrest, and the reactions of Karadzic’s family. The news reports speculated in detail how the trial in the Hague will take place, and described a life in a prison cell in Schevening. TS emphasized the reactions of politicians to Karadzic’s arrest, especially the representatives of EU, USA, NATO, UN, Republic Srbska, BH, Croatia, Monte Negro, Russia and the main Serbian political parties. The everyday protests, with an emphasis on the mass demonstrations organized on the 29th of July 2008 against the Karadzic arrest, have played a prominent role, as did the expressed death threats against the Serbian president, ministers, and journalists. Every day, TS repeatedly presented short biography of Karadzic’s life.

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3 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague is the first international criminal court. Its aim is to secure the foundation of an international jurisprudence on war crimes and crimes against humanity that can be brought to bear globally.
However, to recontextualize the analysis, it's more important to explore which chains of events were not represented. First, our analysis reveals a very selective journalistic choice of events from Karadzic's past. Overall, TS has ignored the events of the BH wars and Karadzic's role in it. In Karadzic’s televised biography TS dealt with this period in a selected way: it represented Karadzic as only in the role of the president of Republic Srpska.

TS has neglected to cover Karadzic’s war crimes that are widely acknowledged among scholars (e.g. Repe, 2008). When describing the main reasons for Karadzic’s arrest, TS did not cover the crime-against-humanity charges of the Hague Tribunal against Karadzic. Instead, it focused only on the legal reasons of the arrest: “a significant step towards Serbia's EU membership” (22 July 2008, TV News), “enormous pressures from the Hague Tribunal and EU” (24 July 2008, TV News) and “a Serbian ticket to finally enter European Union” (26 July 2008, TV News).

The analysed news items completely ignored, for example, the complex theme of Serbian responsibility for such a late arrest of Karadzic. Many important questions were not addressed, such as, who actually knew about Karadzic’s hiding, who was helping him, how long BIA conducted surveillance of Karadzic, and why the arrest came about so late?

TS adopted the same nationalistic principles for the construction of nationalistic discourses as in the past, i.e. the absence of any negative information about Serbia and its role during the 1990s wars, and the presence of only positive information about Serbia (Milivojevic, 2007; Milosevic, 2008). It can be speculated that TS neglected negative information precisely because the negative, traumatic events could remind the Serbs about their role in the BH’s war and present current politics as an unsuccessful, while representing all Serbs in a negative way. TS presented Karadzic’s arrest as a Serbian shift towards EU – and in that, it represents and positions a project of “joining EU” as a positive process, something that brings Serbia closer to EU, to its “modern roots”. The focus on the life of Karadzic as Dabic could be understood as a construction of a particular interpretation of the past, where the Serbs are not responsible for a late arrest, since Karadzic was so hard to be recognized and detected.

**(B) Arrangement**

As argued above, the biography of Karadzic was reported chronologically, following strict historical events, with no interpretation of the events. Also the events about Karadzic’s arrest were represented in a strictly chronological order only. The analysis shows that the TS coverage of the events about Karadzic’s life, arrest and legal process followed a chronological
order and in doing so it represented the events as a sequence of connected and linear events. This reconstruction gives the events a specific meaning, since it differs from news-story conventions (presenting time-movement in terms of causes and effects). It also avoids explicit interpretation of any events, because it does not present time in terms of cause and effect. Journalists use this chronological narration as a ritual strategy in reporting, since it allows the reproduction of a belief in only one, true, natural, so called objective presentation of events.

The second most important effect of chronological narrative, besides naturalization, is the dramatization of events, whereby journalists attempt to attract and seduce the viewers. When TS reported crucial events from either his political career and/or his arrest, TS has used the so called “arrangement” principle in order to construct a belief of objective reporting: it created a linear connection between the events to offer only one and natural interpretation of the events. In that, Karadzic has been (only) the president of Republic Srpska, and now they have arrested him. While employing this particular principle, TS contributes to the masking of the responsibility of the Serbs for the crimes committed in BH. It also attempts to erase the Serbian crimes in BH that were committed in the name of “srpstvo”, with the political, military, economic support of the majority of the Serbs (Repe, 2008).

(C) Abstraction/Personalization

Our analysis shows that the arrest of Radovan Karadzic was generalized in two ways. First, the already limited coverage of Karadzic’s war crimes was portrayed in “a relative way”, enforcing the idea that there was a moral equivalence.

In this response, the source of information has implicitly acknowledged that Karadzic is guilty of the crimes, but he has generalized and relativized them. This strategy remains a crucial strategy for representing war crimes (for more see Wodak, 2006). Besides, the source used the term “an accident”, which is a typical euphemism of the Serbian nationalistic discourse (Lukovic, 2002). This euphemism does not recognise or admit that the crimes have been committed also by the Serbs and uses the term “an accident” – since an accident can happen without a cause and because of some external “objective” force. Since the journalist did not protest the relativization of crimes or at least, demanded an additional explanation, the agreement with the source of information was established.

Second, TS generalized that Karadzic’s arrest means a shift towards the EU path for all the Serbs or Serbia - it attempted to construct a meaning about Karadzic arrest, whereby the Serbs
were confronted with their own past, fulfilled EU’s requirements and for that, they have to be rewarded from the EU side

TS has used the “reverse” principle in its coverage, which we add here to Fairclough’s principles of recontextualization, i.e. personalization. Personalization can be defined as the preference of the individual actor(s) and human interest angles in events, while downplaying institutional and political considerations that establish their social context. The consequence of personalized news is the lack explanation of the social context, especially the explanation of structural power relations. In the analysed news, personalization means a focus on one person only, i.e. a heavy emphasis on Radovan Karadzic and ignoring other social actors and the social context that helped to frame Karadzic’s life – all in order to construct the meaning that Karadzic worked independently, without official state support.

The coverage of Karadzic’s political life in Republic Srpska during the war was also focusing on Karadzic only – as if he had acted in isolation, disconnected from other social actors and out of any historical and political situation. TS has constructed a meaning claiming that current politicians have nothing to do with Karadzic’s politics, despite the fact that they follow it (Repe, 2008). The employment of the principle of generalization served to relativize Karadzic’s crimes and furthermore, represented Karadzic’s arrest as a necessary ticket needed to be paid for entering EU.

(D) Additions

Journalists of TS evaluated the arrest as an evidence for the Serbian break with the past and Serbian willingness to enter EU.

Moreover, TS evaluated Karadzic’s arrest as a crucial obligation that, when fulfilled, demands reward from EU. This arrest should also “raise the image of Serbia within the International Community” (24 July 2008, TV News). Thus, the representation of Karadzic’s arrest was used in order to convey a message to the local, and international community, that Serbia has made a clean break with its past, works on its image, and thus, has to be rewarded.

The second evaluation prevalent among the news items was the evaluation of the main social actors.
The representation of social actors

Our analysis of included social actors shows that TS used the binary oppositions: “we” versus “them”. Many scholars dealing with Serbian media propaganda show how during the 1990s, the discourse of difference was a crucial element forming a nationalistic media discourse (e.g. De la Broose, 2003; Milivojevic, 1996).

For our analysis we have counted all actors (n=41) who are represented in the coverage as a “we” group. Specifically, in Table I, we introduce those actors, who appeared at least 20 times in all 78 news items, since other actors appeared only rarely and there are too many to be all cited. A common characteristic here is that all the “we” social actors were positively represented, and were - except Karadzic – “collectivised” (Van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 50). This was accomplished not only through the use of the first person plural “we”, but also through terms like “Serbia/Serbian nation”, and “our nation”. The “we” group discourse strategy attempts to assure that the positive image of Serbia/Serb prevails as a homogeneous and a consensual.

Table I. Inclusion of social actors of the “we”-group in the news items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor(s) of “we”-group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Radovan) Karadzic</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian nation</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian government</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian citizens</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To illustrate that there is a complexity of the TS representation of main social actors, one needs to see how the “them” group was coded in a particular way. As Table II shows the words “Serbian enemies” were frequently used in order to construct an unspecified and anonymous’ group of them. Van Leeuwen (1996, p. 51) defines this act as an “indetermination”. In this case, it serves the purpose of inclusion of different social actors into a group of “Serbian enemies” and consequently, the construction of a positive “we” group. In these binary oppositions, Serbia appears as a “stronger”, “better”, “more victorious”, “more successful”, i.e. a “superior” nation.

The “them” and the “Hague Tribunal” are constructed as the big “other” and are both positioned as threatening to the Serbian identity. They are both framed as destroyers of the Serbs. Additionally, the Kosovo Albanians continue to be the Serbian Other: they are...
represented as thieves, intent on “stealing” “the cradle of Serbia” and are framed as eternal Serbian enemies (Popov, 2000). The Kosovo Albanians are represented as a much more serious threat than a few years ago, since Kosovo Albanians' independence from Serbia became a reality since February 2008. TS rejected any calls for an independent Kosovo and demanded the “territorial integrity”. The representation of Kosovo as the “cradle of Serbia” continues to remain at the heart of the Serbian nationalistic imaginary (Erjavec & Volcic, 2009; Popov, 2000).

The Hague Tribunal becomes a Serbian new other not only because it requested the arrest of Karadzic and other military leaders, such as Mladic and Hadzic, but also because Slobodan Milosevic died there, and because the evidence from The Hague Tribunal about Serbian war crimes further re-interprets and resists the Serbian self-identity of victimhood in former Yugoslav wars (Popov, 2000).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor(s) of “them”-group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbian enemies</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague Tribunal</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo Albanians</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Union</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Community</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

International community and EU become relatively newly and differently represented social actors. In TS coverage, the international community means different international organizations, such as UN, NATO, The Hague Tribunal and the European Union. International community and EU in particular were represented as those social actors, that do not understand Serbia and the Serbs, they blackmail Serbia, cause Serbia injustice, and demand high requirements. However, this representation is not only negative, since Serbia wants to, at least on the surface, fulfil these requirements (Torov, 2008). The superiority of Serbia towards International community and EU is more implicit than towards other actors, but is visible in TS statements of expectation – Serbia wants to be rewarded for the arrest of Karadzic.

Interestingly, the former Serbian enemies, Bosniaks, that were one of the crucial social actors belonging to “them”-group during the 1990s wars, have not been represented this time at all (see, for example, MacDonald, 2002). Despite the fact that TS cites three different politicians from BH about Karadzic's arrest, Bosniaks are not represented in any other context – neither
as enemies, nor as victims. Perhaps this ignorance of covering Bosnianks has to do with unwillingness to connect Karadzic and the Serbs with committed crimes in Bosnia.

Specifically, we also tried to find out how Karadzic is referred to in the news items. Naming and labelling of a politician is not only a descriptive usage of linguistic resources, but can be indicative of the social processes and practices embedded in the communicative situation regarding, for instance, the social and political position of this leader within society. The names used by the newspaper to refer to Karadzic are a case in point. For the analysis we counted all words (n = 181) referring to Karadzic. Because there was a diversity of words used to refer to Karadzic, the words are arranged into sub-sections, grouped in terms of semantic fields and presented in terms of their numerical presence.

Table III. Lexicalization of Radovan Karadzic in the news items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semantical field</th>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karadzic's life as</td>
<td></td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragan Dabic</td>
<td>Alternative doctor/ doctor of alternative medicine/neuropsychiatrist</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bio-energist/energy-therapist</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poet and a musician</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(dr.) (Dragan) Dabic</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Friendly neighbour</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bohemian</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague Tribunal</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(the most sought after Hague) refugee</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victim of The Hague Court/Tribunal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation/country</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Serb of all the Serbs</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The strongest Serbian hero</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hero of the heroes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family relationships</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brother</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncle</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former president</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A leader of Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful/capable politician</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent conflict</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War criminal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murderer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Osama bin laden</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TS used diverse words to refer to Radovan Karadzic. In its coverage, the emphasis is on the semantic field of life of Radovan Karadzic as Dragan Dabic. The use of words, such as “alternative doctor”, “bioenergetic”, “poet”, “musician”, “friendly neighbour”, and even “a lover”, shows that TS attempted to explicitly position Karadzic as a nice, warm, friendly, emotional, loving, and intelligent man, who possesses some spiritual powers and cannot really be “a war criminal”.

On the other side, there are only three names referring negatively to Karadzic, published five times altogether. Because of journalistic attempts to present the coverage as “objective”, the news stories also had to include negative opinions from Western media and politicians. But, in this respect, journalists neither contextualized nor interpreted Karadzic's role during the BH wars. Instead, words with positive connotations were used to describe Karadzic and his regime (“former president”), leaving no space for doubts about his legacy.

Karadzic was named as “the most sought after Hague refugee” - however, this is incorrect according to the Hague Tribunal that sees Mladic as number one. However, TS did not often cover positive evaluations of Karadzic either (for example, “the greatest Serbian hero”), as stated by Serbian nationalistic politicians.

TS also positioned Karadzic within family relations, in order to portray him as a good husband, father, brother and uncle. The analysis reveals that the newspaper used the least words when covering Karadzic as a politician. Here is one of the rare examples of the portrayal of Karadzic as a successful politician. A statement from a “common man”, from the
capitol city of Republike Srbske connotes, that Karadzic is a good politician because he has gained some territory for the Serbs, and not lost it, like Slobodan Milosevic. According to these accounts, Milosevic has lost the elections precisely because he has lost Kosovo (Popov, 2002). The infrequency of representations portraying Karadzic as “a politician” can be explained through TS’s careful avoidance of socio-historical facts, since the television could not have represented Karadzic as a politician in detailed without covering his war crimes.

Conclusion
The arrest of Karadzic offered a crucial moment for Serbia to reconfigure its past and its role in 1990s wars in the former Yugoslavia. However, we argue TS has only reproduced a specific type of a nationalistic discourse – which is not full of hate towards the other nations as it was in 1990s, but successfully uses the strategy of denial and exclusion of sensitive themes that would connect Serbia to Karadzic’s crimes, expose its role in Yugoslav conflicts, and rob Serbia is “superior” feeling.

The lack of coverage of those themes, which form an important part of a particular social life, could not be entirely excluded, but were de-emphasised, and pushed into the background. Since the themes about Karadzic’s crimes and about political responsibility for such a late Karadzic’s arrest were too crucial for the construction of Serbian politics and identity (Erjavec & Volcic, 2009), we could claim, that TS did not overlook them, but used the strategy of limited exposure. On the other hand, TS used the strategy of a “detailed” representation of themes and social actors, which represented Serbia as a successful country, able to face its past and marching towards EU. At the same time, TS continued employing its bipolar nationalistic representation of social actors, in which the Serbs are represented as superior, especially above the others, the “Serbian enemies”. TS, while covering Kosovo Albanians, still employed the explicit nationalistic discourse and it represented as “thieves of the cradle of Serbia”. TS has ambivalent relation towards international community and EU, which could be described as a negative-inspiring one. In the TS vision, these two social actors do not understand the Serbs, even more, they threaten the Serbs and conduct unjust policies, when they blackmail the Serbs with more and more demands. However, the Serbs want to meet international community’s demands in order to enter EU.

Most of the news about Karadzic’s life and arrest were represented also in a chronological way, which ignored any explicit interpretation of events, except those that focused on Karadzic as “only” a president of Republic of Srpska, but now successfully arrested. TS also used personalization – in that it transferred any responsibility on Karadzic, establish a
distance and in that, show how Serbian politics and current situation in Serbia are entirely
different from his. Generalization strategy was also employed, in order to relativize the
minimal representation of Karadzic’s crimes. The minimal representation of Karadzic as a
politician and a war criminal attempted to hide all the links between destructive Karadzic’s
politics and Serbia.

The representation of the arrest of Karadzic has been used to convey the message to the local,
but also international public, that Serbia has broken with the past, and has to be rewarded for
this.

Thus, TS appropriated Karadzic’s arrest into the predominant implicit nationalistic discourse.
It recontextualized pre-existing discourses to reproduce nationalism for a new, “pro-
European” politics. Implicit nationalistic discourse includes the same elements as a previous
nationalistic one, except that it carefully hides those nationalistic sentiments that would
openly harm “pro-European” Serbian politics.

This recontextualization is implicated in the creation of a national consensus with no attempt
to provide a space for critical discussion and interpretation of Karadzic’s and Serbia’s role
during the war in BH. This recontextualization takes place in a very unstable social and
economic situation in Serbia, since Serbia continues to be one of the less developed and more
highly socially stratified states in Europe. Also the political situation continues to be tense in
light of the Kosovo independence, since public opinion polls show the majority of Serbs in
summer of 2008 heavily support Kosovo as part of Serbia and cannot imagine it being an
independent state (Faktor Plus, 2008). Furthermore, Serbian nationalistic parties still enjoy a
high popularity and support among the Serbian public (ibid.). On the other side the
international community is pressuring Serbia to extradite also Mladic and Hadzic and
demands from Serbia some crucial economic, political, and social changes within, so it could
join the candidacy to enter EU.

**References**

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