Rethinking Communication, Creativity and Cultural Production: Outlining Issues for Media Practice

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Abstract

The study of communication has not concentrated much of its global research effort on the way messages are created. Most often there has been a set of commonsense assumptions used about the notion of creativity itself and how this applies to media practice. However, there has been considerable research undertaken in other disciplines focused on gaining a rational understanding of creativity and how it works. We can therefore no longer assume that our commonsense assumptions provide a sound base for thinking about communication, creativity and cultural production. Consequently, if a research based understanding of creativity is applied to the issues that are currently pertinent to media practice in radio, journalism, television, film, photography, popular music and digital media, and then absorbed into the study of communication and cultural production, the focus of these issues will inevitably change as well. If this is the case then we need to put in place a slightly different set of practices to stimulate and think about creativity in the media.

Key Words

creativity, cultural production, systems model, media.
Introduction

Arthur Berger has asserted that: “Artists tend to be the forgotten men and women in the field of mass communication scholarship. Researchers devote a great deal of attention to audiences and to the media, and to effects of mass-mediated texts on audiences in particular and on society in general. But there has not been a great deal of attention paid, generally speaking, to the people who write the scripts, perform them, direct the performers, and provide the technical expertise necessary to create texts of all kinds” (Berger 1995, pp. 145-146).

If an investigation of creativity and cultural production is, therefore, an important research concern for those studying communication how is one to approach it? Given the stubbornly persistent commonsense views of creativity it would seem to be a daunting task; a task that some argue we shouldn’t even attempt as it would begin to take the mystery out of it. However, what we can state is that despite the common assumptions that go with the word creativity there is now enough research at the empirical and rational level (e.g. Sternberg 1999, Negus & Pickering 2004, Pope 2005, Sawyer 2006) to identify a more useful and rationally based conception of creativity. This should allows us to begin the process of answering one of the questions Paul Cobley posited in The Communication Theory Reader (1996, p.1); how are messages created?

Creativity and Cultural Production: A Literature Review

Current commonsense thinking about creativity in the west is intimately linked to the Judeo-Christian creation myth and the Greek ideas embodied in the Platonic notion of the muse. It is a small leap to take from there to justify modern notions of individual genius (Howe, 1999). The classic Romantic view (Watson 2005, pp. 606-623 and Sawyer 2006, pp.15-18) also claims that creativity has a lot to do with what is extraordinary about individual creative effort. This line of reasoning can be partly traced back to Kantian ideas on aesthetics and eventually resulted in the idea that creative individuals possess a gift or talent that is beyond the grasp of mere mortals. With Sir Francis Galton also seeing genius as heritable and Caesare Lombroso linking insanity and genius (in Rothenberg & Hausman, 1976) it is little wonder that an image of creative individuals as deviant became commonplace. Sigmund Freud accepted these ideas uncritically (Petrie 1991, pp. 4-5) and took on what were primarily Romantic and inspirationist assumptions leading to a view of artists as quasi-neurotic individuals engaged in a form of classic Romantic agony. These imaginative constructs have now become ingrained myths about creativity. But they do not stand up to much research.
scrutiny. The empirical work of Robert Weisberg (1993), in particular, has lead to many of the ideas associated with the concept of genius being seen to be essentially unsupportable. This is not to say that talent and extraordinary work do not occur but that the concept of individual genius, and all that goes with it, may not be the most apt one to use in explaining them.

If we concentrate our investigations of creativity on the individual then it would be reasonable to assume that biological and psychological approaches to this conception would be the most valid. While summaries of the biological base of creativity can be found in the work of Colin Martindale (in Sternberg, 1999, pp. 137-152) there have also been a number of speculative and commercially successful applications of associated concepts of creativity. But the validity of the ideas being sold, such as lateral thinking, has been subject to minimal empirical scrutiny (Sternberg 1999, pp. 5-6). As an example, the research work of Joseph and Glenda Bogen (in Rothenberg & Hausman, 1976, pp. 256-251) in the sixties on lateral dominance has led some to “extrapolate wildly from fairly restricted data until every human polarity is ascribed to hemispheric difference” (Truax, 1984, p. 52). What needs to be noted is that, despite the popular adoption of left brain/right brain curriculums, there is very little in the current research to support them (Pope 2005, p. 115).

Besides these approaches the larger research focused field of psychology, in all its neuro, cognitive, psychoanalytic, behavioural and social variants, has produced a significant body of work that has contributed to a scientific understanding of creativity (Bergquist 1999, Sternberg 1999, Runco & Pritzker 1999 and Sawyer 2006). It deserves to be partially summarized here.

The psychodynamic school, seen in works by Sigmund Freud and others (see Sternberg, 1999), has centered its exploration of creativity on the tensions thought to exist between conscious and unconscious drives. The positivist turn in psychology then produced psychometric approaches which attempted to measure aspects of creativity quantitatively (Sawyer, 2006). The problematics of these attempts led, in part, to the development of cognitive approaches to the study of creativity. This approach sought an explanation of this basic human phenomenon by grappling with the cognitive processes thought to underpin creativity (Zolberg, 1990). Following this approach B.F. Skinner, and the group that became known as the behaviourists, saw creativity as a cognitive behaviour pattern largely unconscious to the individual (Bergquist, 1999). Weisberg (1993), on the other hand, proposed that ordinary cognitive processes applicable in everyday situations held the most appropriate solution to understanding creativity. The social-personality approaches that
developed alongside the cognitive school suggested that personality variables, motivation, and the sociocultural environment a creative individual existed in were also sources of creativity (Sternberg, 1999). Finally, neuropsychology, with an insistence on a monist version of the alleged brain/mind duality, began explaining aspects of creativity in terms of the relationships between neurochemical processes and certain cognitive states. It focused some attention on the connection between the action of neurotransmitters, such as dopamine and serotonin, and how these are related to creative activity (Greenfield, 2008). On their own each of these schools of thought provide an explanation for creativity that is primarily focused on individual aspects of the phenomenon. In Simonton’s terms they are mostly psychologically reductionist (Simonton, 2003) and as such the factors they look at are necessary but not sufficient to explain creativity.

If the search for the truth about creativity at the level of the individual is problematic then where do we reliably begin to look for what else may be involved? If Graeme Wallas’s notion that creativity occurs across a set of stages (in Rothenberg & Hausman, 1976, pp. 69-73) is true, while noting that his ideas have been modified and contested, then one could argue that preparatory work, that is gaining knowledge, and evaluation of ideas, that is making judgements about them, are just as important to understanding creativity as the moment of illumination is. This recognition suggests that social and cultural factors may also be important to creativity. Dean Keith Simonton (2003), for one, has pursued these ideas at the macro level. Building on the work of Sorokin and Kavolis, Simonton provides a large frame view of complex historical factors at work on periods of creative efflorescence. Karl Marx also understood that all art is a social product with this maxim becoming the starting point for many investigators. Adorno’s critique of the culture industry is a case in point where he, and others, attempted to marry the individually focused ideas of Freud with the larger structural concerns of Marx. While this exercise was problematic other critiques have also conceived of art as primarily a collective practice. Howard Becker’s (1982) work on art worlds, while it lacked an account of objective social structures similar in intent to that of Pierre Bourdieu (1993), did supply a fresh perspective at the time (Zolberg, 1990, pp. 124-126). Janet Wolff (1981) also contends that creative work must be seen as a collective enterprise but argues individuals, as decisive agents, are highly dependent on the structures that both enable and constrain their activity. She argues, similarly to Bourdieu, that “structures enable human practices, by providing the conditions of action and offering choices of action” (1981, p. 24).

Nonetheless, it is the poststructuralists who have posed the most radical alternative to the individual centred approach of the genius model of creativity. Roland Barthes (1977), who in a famous polemic suggested the author was dead, argued that meaning making occurs at the
point where reading and texts intersect. Meaning wasn’t imposed by a God-like author-genius figure. For Barthes interpretation became the primary creative act. With support from Michel Foucault (1979) in his elaboration of the author-function these poststructuralist positions became hard to argue against. However, as Janet Wolff suggests, while there is certainly a need to reconceptualise our understanding of individualistic approaches to creative production (Wolff, 1993, p. 147) works of art, as well as scientific innovations, do not give birth to themselves in some sort of parthenogenetic process (Zolberg, 1990, p. 114). Producers are still necessary. On the other hand we can’t simply fall back into claiming that cultural products are, as was previously thought, works of individual genius. The research suggests that there is something happening apart from the author-genius figure acting as a simple conduit for the acts of creative interpretation readers of texts engage in.

To put this in Hegelian terms, the synthesis of the thesis of the romantic genius and the poststructuralist antithesis of interpreters as ultimate creator, may be found in conceptions of creativity that resolve the classic agency/structure dichotomy. It is this opposition that sits at the heart of Romanticism and the commonsense myths that have sprung from it. If the supposed bi-polar oppositions of agency, the ability to choose, and structure, as deterministic processes, can be resolved a solution to reconceptualising creativity may be found. What is required is a replacement of the more Ptolemaic or person-centered view of creativity with a more Copernican conception (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, p. 336). This conception would become a way of seeing creativity which recognizes that an individual producer is involved but it would also recognize that they are part of a much larger system in operation.

Fortunately the advent of what has been labelled ‘the confluence approach to creativity’ eschews the focus on the individual alone and does so in favour of a recognition that multiple factors must come into play for creativity to emerge. This approach is exemplified by the recent work of Teresa Amabile (1996) Howard Gruber (1988) David Feldman, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, and Howard Gardner (1994), Robert Weisberg (1993), Robert Sternberg & Todd Lubart (1991) and Dean Keith Simonton (2003). However, it is the work of American psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 1997 and 1999) coupled with the research of European empirical sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1990, 1993 & 1996) that supplies the most comprehensive attempt to explain creativity and cultural production. They do so in similarly complex ways.

The systems model developed by psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi proposes that three major factors, that is, a structure of knowledge manifest in a particular symbol system (domain), a structured social organisation that understands that body of knowledge (field), and...
an individual agent (person) who makes changes to the stored information that pre-exists them, are necessary for creativity to occur. These factors operate through “dynamic links of circular causality” (1988, p. 329) with the starting point in the process being “purely arbitrary” (ibid) indicating the systems essential nonlinearity. Each component factor in the system is as equally important as the others as each “affects the others and is affected by them in turn” (Csikszentmihalyi 1988, p. 329). Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1990, 1993 & 1996) suggests something quite similar. He argues that it is the interplay between a field of works which presents possibilities of action to an individual who possesses the necessary habitus, partially composed of personal levels of social, cultural, symbolic and economic capital that then inclines them to act and react within particular structured and dynamic spaces called fields. These fields are arenas of production and circulation of goods, ideas and knowledges. They are populated by other agents who compete using various levels of the forms of capital pertinent to that field. Bourdieu suggests that it is the interplay between these various spheres of cultural production that makes practice possible.

Contrary to the idea of the free-willed self-expressive artist typified by the Romantic ideal it appears that, according to this latest research, creative agents are, at one and the same time, both enabled and constrained by the structures they engage with. In fact it is difficult for an agent to make decisions of the type required by creativity without being entwined in structures. If this is the case this reconceptualisation of creativity and cultural production suggests a rethinking of the various issues that have faced radio, journalism, television, film, photography, popular music and digital media.

**Rethinking Issues for Media Practice**

Given the above changes in the way creativity is thought about in the research world, rather than maintaining a commonsense approach to it, it would seem that a change in our approach to some of the issues faced in media practice may be necessary. As W.I Thomas’s dictum (1966) suggests, if we change the way we define the world it follows that the social and cultural consequences that spring from that re-definition must also change.

For example, the organisational structures that radio operates with (Hendy, 2000) have been thought to impinge on an individual’s freedom to make decisions. However, if it can be argued that the agents in the system of radio aren’t just constrained but also enabled by the structures that exist there what happens to the idea that commercial radio, in particular, stifles creativity? What needs to be thought through is how the institutional and professional structures of both commercial and public radio are connected to daily decision making by
those working in radio not only in a negative sense but also in a positive one. The work of Anthony Giddens (1979) becomes useful here as it not only pursues the compatibility of agency and structure but it also complements Bourdieu’s central philosophical quest, i.e. the resolution of the opposition of agency and structure. A recognition of the intimate relationship between agency and structure inevitably raises questions about what constitutes free will. Following Hume (1952), rather than being simply the absence of constraint freedom may, in fact, be necessarily relative to the structures that allow it to occur. Giddens’ general argument is that the ability to choose at an institutional level is dependent on the structures an agent, in this case a radio operative, engages with. Giddens invented the term structuration to explain this enmeshing of agency with structure. Structuration not only has an effect at the institutional level but it may also have a similar effect at the individual level. For example, the decisions a music or program director makes about what to put to air sit within what is required by the radio format, day part and so on. Giddens would argue that these decisions are not constrained but made possible, that is, enabled by the structures of the format as well as the institutional framework they occur in. Rather than being free and unfettered, these creative acts are enabled by the structures radio operatives have surrounded themselves with. This is a different conception to that which sees any impinging action, whether it is from management or the format, as detrimental to creativity. Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence (McIntyre 2006) to suggest that individual radio operatives at Triple J are similarly constrained and enabled, at one and the same time by the structures they engage with, as those working within the Austereo network.

Similarly, journalists are generally absorbed into a series of socialisations and enculturations that then allows them to acquire a journalist’s habitus. They acquire a ‘news sense’ and, without consciously thinking about it, make decisions based on their understanding of what constitutes news (McQuail 1994, pp. 213-232 and 267-276) and what is expected of their writing (Sheridan-Burns, 2002). As such they are not ‘free’ to write as they please in the absolute sense typified by Romanticism. However, this doesn’t preclude them from being described as creative especially if the phenomenon of creativity is conceived in the way the research literature above indicates and recent empirical evidence suggests is the case (Fulton 2008, pp.3-6). While there have been a number of ethnographies of the newsroom produced (see Cottle 2007 and Zelizer 2004) Janet Fulton’s work moves one step closer to recognizing that production work of this type takes place on a systemic basis. It may also be seen that an attempt to produce radical difference or excellence in a journalist’s work, a hallmark of creativity in the west but one which is not universally shared (Niu & Sternberg, 2006), is what keeps journalists motivated (Gardner et.al., 2001). However, it has been argued that extrinsic motivators, such as monetary reward, may actually inhibit creative activity (Amabile, 1983).
If this is the case, how is it possible for journalists, faced with structural constraints and extrinsic inhibitors, to produce excellent work which many of them do? It may well be that what keeps a journalist motivated to write well is a desire to return again and again to a particular ‘flow’ state while they are writing (Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi, 1988).

A further argument runs that mass produced media output could not possibly be creative in the same way as high culture is creative. Take television as an example. It is bound by the rules of a format and, as the argument goes, it must produce standardised or uncreative material (e.g. Ryan, 1991). This is a position that, at the epistemological level, sees any structure as inhibiting to a truly free creative act. The problem is that this argument relies too heavily on a set of Romantic assumptions; assumptions that do not hold up when scrutinized by those researching creativity. Additionally the use of the terms form, format and formula are also often conflated. Nonetheless, all culture has form. Form, as a structural component of all communication does not necessarily stop creativity but may actually allow or enable it to occur. Without form communication is impossible but form is itself a manifestation of a tradition in operation (Negus & Pickering, 2004). Genre, on the other hand, is simply a set of forms that have become traditional (Berger, 1994). Formatting is something slightly different. It is a systematic process that allows the speedy processing of televisual communication over an extended period of time. However, once formatted material becomes formularized, excellence tends to cease. Yet, as Negus and Pickering (2004) argue, it can no longer be claimed that tradition is antithetical to creativity as there are a number of cases of innovative television programs derived from formal genre types using a formatted approach. Examples include the scripting and camera work associated with *The West Wing* or the characterizations evident in *The Sopranos*. From this position the research indicates that creativity is not only about rule breaking but may be just as readily be about rule acquisition and application (Bailin 1988, Weisberg 1993). In short, a creative person must know the rules of the domain and field first before they can break them. While there have been a number of ethnographies of production that reveal television production is less about confirming ‘author/god’ models and reveal, among other things, a complex understanding of the nature of multiple authorship (Alvarado & Buscombe 1978, Moran 1982, Tulloch & Alvarado 1983 and Tulloch & Moran 1986), few of them have, as yet, moved into seeing this creative process as systemic. This situation is also applicable to film.

While ever film struggles to validate itself as high art, a conception tangled up with Romanticism, it will need to create the figure of the individual artist as genius. These individuals can then readily operate within the star system of film, now a commercial necessity for this form of communication and cultural production. The paradoxes within this...
position are, once again, bound together with a number of inspirationist and romantic assumptions (Petrie, 1991). The struggle for canonical legitimation some in the film industry see as necessary can be observed most readily in the person-centred polemic of the auteur theory outlined by Francois Truffaut, Andrew Sarris and others (Petrie 1991, p. 14). The ongoing critiques of this theory firstly ventured into structuralism (Wollen, 1969) then quickly found their antithesis in poststructuralist critiques, that is, observing a group of films as a text or critical construct where the ‘author’ is no longer a person but is, for the sake of analysis, “a system of relations among several films bearing the same signature” (Bordwell & Thompson 1997, p. 39). Despite these necessary shifts in thinking, it appears the prevailing opinion in film studies has as yet to fully encounter the methodical appraisal of creativity built into the systems model (Csikszentmihalyi, 2004). This confluence model may be the synthesis required to reconceptualise the directors’, writers’, editors’ and camerapersons’ creative roles in the collaborative process of film making, as outlined in the PBE study recently conducted by Susan Kerrigan (2006 & 2008), and thus provides the basis for a pragmatic re-evaluation of the currently prevailing critiques of auteur theory.

Because of its relationship to technology photography has also been pre-occupied with its place as either craft or its place as great Art (e.g. Wells 2004). It has been argued, however, that humans have always engaged in constructing aesthetically beautiful objects but the conception of Art, as the west knows it (Dissanayake 1995, p. 41), is a specific socio/cultural and historical construct traceable to the Renaissance (Wolff, 1981). It is therefore relative to the world in which it is observed and valorized from. What is seen as Art has thus varied over time (Malraux in Osborne, 1968:21) and its modern conception is a difficult one to sustain with any degree of certainty. However, in order to attract both kudos and funding, photography, like film and novels before it, has attempted to validate itself within this framework (Sawyer 2006, p. 26). Once the genius figure with their artist’s aura, and the notion of Art as a form of non-utilitarian aesthetics, is seen to be a problematic conception of creativity (Bailin 1988, pp. 96-97), where does this leave the perceived differences between Art and craft, a distinction that relies on these differences for its existence? A similar situation occurs for many genres of popular music.

If ever there was a cultural form that maintained a belief in the myths of romantic and inspirational creativity popular music is it. Despite the collaborative nature of record making or live performance in the music industry (Frith, 2001) there has been an insistence on a belief in individual genius figures who have been inspired by various muses and who are unconstrained and free to channel their songs from mystical sources (Wicke, 1990). Music journalists reinforce these myths and performers build them around themselves (Shuker,
2001). They are echoed by the audiences for popular music who happily oppose art with commerce (Negus 1996, pp. 47-61) and tie convoluted knots in their logic trying to sustain the myths in order to maintain valid cultural territory. It is seen most vividly in the arguments about mainstream music as uncreative and thus inauthentic. This is a thorny issue for popular music. Arguments on authenticity can be traced to the industrialisation of culture and Enlightenment thinking. As Peter Wicke (1990) has asserted, Kantian notions of aesthetics and their Romantic illusions were bought into rock, in particular, by art school attendees and lecturers and were generally accepted by those engaged in popular music uncritically from then on. For example, post-sixties rock artists are still seen as free-willed agents heroically fighting the structures of the industry to maintain their creative freedom (Negus 1996, p. 36). Despite their lack of a rational or empirical base these essentially Romantic ideas are accepted as gospel within popular music and thus have very real implications for songwriters in the studio and in the marketplace (McIntyre, 2008).

Finally, with the copyright industries contributing significantly to the GDP of most western countries it is little wonder that there has been some concern at an industry and governmental level, and at the coalface of creative activity, with the implications of technological change. The use of technology that delivers the ability to clone and disseminate the property of others has caused a reconsideration of how the associated rights are to be assigned and protected. While copyright law developed historically (Samuels 2000) in tandem with the rise of the notion of individual rights and the concomitant understanding of creative genius typical of romanticism (Bently, 1990), the pragmatic implications of reconceptualising creativity have as yet to be fully worked through by a largely slow moving legal system. The introduction of tools such as the Creative Commons in the U.K. are certainly an attempt to deal with the results of what can be seen as anachronistic laws based on outmoded conceptions of creativity. Ironically, those who advocate them tend to do so from a position that valorises the Romantic form of creativity. While the poststructuralist conceptions of the death of the author do not offer any real alternative, until a new set of laws can be formulated around the reconceptualisations of creativity suggested by the confluence models of creativity, the technological possibilities will continue to allow the current laws to be practically bypassed (McIntyre, 2007).

Conclusion

With all of these ideas being currently discussed and debated, especially in the light of the advent of the notion of creative industries (Florida 2002, Hartley 2005), one more question needs to be asked and answered. If either the inspirationist or romantic understandings of
creativity are subscribed to it would be somewhat difficult to either teach or learn how to be creative? One either possesses creativity or one doesn’t. However, if creativity is conceived as a rational rather than a mystical process (McIntyre & McIntyre, 2007) then the possibility of improving creativity in all media practice jumps significantly. This learning process can be understood more clearly with the clarification of three points.

Firstly, there often appears to be a fallacious distinction made between the creativity ordinary people engage in and that which is seen to be extraordinary. This can be resolved by looking at Margaret Boden’s (1994 & 2004) conception of P and H creativity. She states that “there can be no psychological [P] explanation of this historical [H] category. But all H-creative ideas, by definition, are P-creative too” (Boden 1994, p. 77). Boden’s distinctions give a useful framework for explaining the similarities that exist between those who are lauded for groundbreaking creativity and those who continue the daily business of making creative decisions in the media. They again reinforce the notion that creativity is not the result of operating with some universally fixed and mystically transcendent process but is, in part, a matter of selection and social validation by a contextually dependent system at work.

Secondly, further investigation is needed of the stages of the creative process proposed by Graeme Wallas (in Rothenberg & Hausman, 1976). Wallas saw the stages of creativity as: preparation, incubation, illumination and verification. Wallas’s stages can also be seen to be compressed into simple intuition followed by verification (Bastick, 1982) and may also be expanded to include motivation, preparation cogitation, illumination, verification and distribution. These stages, however, must be seen as highly iterative and recursive rather than linear (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). With these qualifications in mind these temporally discontinuous stages can then be mapped on to the systems model of creativity and, along with the motivation supplied by autotelic experience, provide a practical method (Sawyer, 2006) for undertaking creative work in all forms of media practice and cultural production. This would be far more pragmatically useful for media practitioners than a Romantic understanding of creativity has been so far.

Thirdly, the arguments that spring from the bipolar oppositions of agency versus structure, voluntarism versus determinism and freedom versus constraint, oppositions that underpin many of the assumptions made about creativity in the media, can be resolved once it is realized that these dichotomies are complementary rather than oppositional. In this case media practitioners don’t have to eschew a set of constraints to be creative. They can become creative by assimilating into their being the codes, conventions and knowledge frameworks their particular media engages with and taking on board the way the social organization of the...
field they deal with makes decisions. Once these structured processes become intuitive to a practitioner the ideas and actions that spring from them will follow. These necessary structures can be embraced more fully, with obvious caution, once it is realised that structures not only inhibit and constrain creativity but they, at one and the same time, just as readily encourage and enable it.

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